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RECENT BOOKS 
THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY. By Zechariah Chafee, Jr. Philadelphia 
and New York: J. B. Lippincott Co. 1956. Pp. 350. $5. 
The delightful thing about Professor Chafee's writings on civil liberties 
is that he generally manages to introduce a note of freshness and individual-
ity, a sense of genuine reexamination and rediscovery, into the subject. 
This characteristic is markedly true of his latest volume, The Blessings of 
Liberty, which, although it is primarily a collection of individual pieces 
previously published in various periodicals or delivered on particular occa-
sions, has as a unifying conception the personal attitude of Zechariah 
Chafee toward the outstanding current problems of civil liberties.1 The 
total effect is that of listening to an urbane and scholarly gentleman, with 
not inconsiderable experience in the give and take of commissions, com-
mittees, and other aspects of government and university administration, 
who sits down one evening among friends, lights his pipe, and delivers 
himself of a rather discursive monologue upon various subjects which have 
been troubling him. For a reviewer who is fundamentally in agreement 
with the point of view expressed, and thoroughly charmed by the manner 
of expressing it, the delicate task is to avoid the extremes of sycophantic 
praise and captious criticism. Perhaps one way out is to pretend that we 
too are sitting with Mr. Chafee listening to his monologue, occasionally 
throwing in a query or a comment, to express a passing doubt, or to pro-
voke some further elaboration or merely to emphasize agreement. 
It is a tribute to Mr. Chafee's intellectual courage that he dares to begin 
by asking what are some rather obvious but extremely difficult questions; 
for example, "What is democracy?" and "Why I like it." His answers to 
neither of the questions is susceptible of simple summary. Thus he suggests 
that a large measure of self-government through the electoral process is an 
essential element. But just how far the franchise should extend and through 
what means it should be exercised has varied so widely both in time and 
place, even among western democracies, as to emphasize the difficulty of a 
doctrinaire definition. As for "Why I like it" Mr. Chafee suggests two 
answers: (1) "I cannot conceive of any alternative which would be tol-
erable,'' (p. 60) and (2) "It is no accident that democracies have arisen in 
communities with a strong religious consciousness, in the broadest sense of 
religion to embrace all kinds of faith in the brotherhood of men and their 
equality before the Spirit of the Universe, however conceived." (p. 61) 
In more specific terms, how far does this carry us toward agreement 
with the position taken by Mr. Justice Douglas in speaking for the Court 
in Zorach v. Clausen: "We are a religious people whose institutions pre-
1 The subjects covered, in addition to those mentioned more specifically later, are 
the recommendations of the American Bar Association for a loyalty oath for lawyers 
(chapter 6) and the exercise of the "Right Not To Speak" (chapter 7). 
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suppose a Supreme Being. We guarantee the freedom to worship as one 
chooses. We make room for as wide a variety of beliefs and creeds as the 
spiritual needs of man deem necessary. We sponsor an a_ttitude on the part 
of government that shows no partiality to any one group and that lets. each 
flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma. 
When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious 
authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, 
it follows the best of our traditions. For it then respects the religious nature 
of our people and accommodates the public service to their spiritual needs."2 
Mr. Chafee does not address himself specifically to the question of re-
leased time-the issue in the Zorach case-even in his chapter on religious 
liberty. He does, however, make a comment on the general question of 
religious instruction in the public schools which is worth remembering, at 
least as a qualification to what Mr. Justice Douglas says: "Sometimes nos-
talgia for what we have given up creeps over us. Men sometimes lament, 
for instance, that our public schools are godless. Suppose we admit frankly 
that this is a loss to the public schools, that one very important part of our 
nature has to be wholly neglected in the place where we receive much of 
the shaping of our characters and minds. It is a price to pay, but we must 
look at all which we have bought thereby. We cannot reject a portion of 
the bargain and insist on keeping the rest. If the noble ideal of the Puritans 
had persisted, there would be no godless schools in Massachusetts and there 
would be nobody in her churches except Congregationalists. Through the 
choice which all of the United States has made, it becomes possible for men 
of many different faiths to live and work together for many noble ends with-
out allowing their divisions in spiritual matters to become, as in the old 
days, unbridgeable chasms running through every aspect of human lives." 
(p. 266) 
Another one of the difficult questions which Mr. Chafee attempts to 
answer is, "Does free speech really tend to produce truth?" (c. 4) In consider-
ing this question Mr. Chafee pays particular attention to the view that public 
discussion is for the most part a cacophony of special interest pleading 
which serves only to enhance rather than resolve controversy. He does not, 
however, address himself to the more penetrating argument that speech 
which attacks the foundations of a free society-which openly asserts, and 
seeks to gain adherents for, the proposition that democracy should be dis-
carded and some form of authoritarian society established-is itself not 
within the constitutional protection of freedom of speech because it rejects 
the premises upon which th~ constitutional protection is founded.3 We 
2 343 U.S. 306 at 313-315 (1952). 
3 This view is presented with particular cogency in Auerbach, "The Communist 
Control Act of 1954: a Proposed Legal-Political Theory of Free Speech," 23 UNIV. CHI. L. 
R.Ev. 173 (1956). However, Professor Auerbach confines his argument to the constitutional 
level and as a matter of policy reaches the conclusion that complete suppression of the 
Communist Party in our own country at this particular time is unwise. The distinction 
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might rephrase Mr. Chafee's general question in terms of this particular 
one: Do we dare to subject the proposition that freedom of speech is the 
best test of truth to its own test? Perhaps the answer is too obvi(?US to be 
worth stating. If we are not prepared to take this risk, what reason do 
we have for not accepting the proposition itself? The explanation given 
to justify such an apparent inconsistency has been that with respect to 
most questions of public policy a mistake once made is not irrevocable; 
if further experience, debate and reflection reveals the mistake, the de-
cision may be revoked and corrected. Not so of the issue between freedom 
and authoritarianism; if the authoritarians win the argument and take 
hold of the powers of government, their first move is to suppress dissent 
and end the debate, thus making impossible, short of war or revolution, a 
return to freedom. It will be noted that the argument, thus stated, does 
not take into account the alternative risk-the extent to which the basic 
conceptions of freedom gain strength from being exposed to intellectual 
attack and lose vitality by being isolated from them. Here we deal with 
imponderables which outrun experience, even though reference is frequently 
made to the triumph of Nazism in Germany and Communism in Czecho-
slovakia as examples of devastating results of toleration of intolerance. 
These examples would be more persuasive if there were any reason to 
believe that an attempt to outlaw Nazi doctrine in Germany or Communist 
doctrine in Czechoslovakia would have led to any different result. In each 
case did not the triumphs of the authoritarians come because the existing 
government failed to protect the power which was legally its own-without 
any suppression of freedom of speech or peaceful association-but which 
it lacked the will to protect because of internal or external pressures?4 The 
experiences of Germany and Czechoslovakia are indeed terrifying examples 
of the truth that a theoretical commitment to freedom and the existence of 
democratic forms of government may not be sufficient to protect such insti-
tutions from destruction. That is hardly synonymous with saying that the 
best way to protect them is to attempt to silence the kind of criticism which 
challenges the foundations of freedom. 
The foregoing probably sounds like an extremely theoretical discussion 
of a pretty abstract question. Nevertheless, it is intimately related to the 
particular manifestations of restriction or protection of freedom-depending 
upon how you look at them-with which Mr. Chafee is concerned. For 
example, the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, more familiarly 
between constitutional and policy considerations in the area of freedom of speech 
obviously defies adequate discussion in a footnote. Nevertheless it is hazarded that where 
the considerations relate primarily to the protection of freedom itself-to the prevention 
of abuses which seem inevitably to develop once any form of suppression is attempted 
on the basis of what is good or bad doctrine-we are dealing with constitutional funda-
mentals: Compare Rostow, "The Democratic Character of Judicial Review," 66 HARV. 
L. REv. 193 (1952). 
• See, e.g., HALPERIN, GERMANY TRIES DEMOCRACY (1946). 
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known as the McCarran Act, imposes various handicaps, restrictions and 
disabilities upon organizations found to be devoted, both in principle and 
in activity, to the establishment within the United States of a totalitarian 
dictatorship under the general control of the world Communist movement. 
Putting aside relatively inconsequential quibbles as to the real effect of the 
sanctions of the statute-whether they operate merely to disclose the true 
nature of the prescribed organizations or to destroy them by onerous condi-
tions-it is plain that the primary justification for the statute, if there is 
one, is that the organizations within its ambit, are devoted to the destruction 
of the foundations of a free society. To supporters of the statute surely 
this alone would be sufficient to justify complete suppression of the organ-
izations and punishment of the individual members. Insofar as the statute 
does not go all the way in either regard it is a model of self-restraint on the 
part of the democracy which is being attacked. For Mr. Chafee, on the other 
hand, such legislation represents a threat to one of the most vital aspects 
of a vibrant democracy, namely voluntary associations through which men 
translate their private views into effective instruments of public opinion. 
The choice between these two opposed positions is again a choice be-
tween dangers. Which is the greater danger: that organizations devoted 
to the destruction of freedom will, if legally undeterred, gain enough ad-
herents substantially to threaten freedom; or that the legal instruments 
supposedly fashioned to protect freedom will operate so as to hamper the 
healthy functioning of democratic institutions. Logic does not provide 
the answer. Mr. Chafee undertakes to find it in judgment informed by ex-
perience. He is satisfied that "Actual experience amply justifies the ex-
pectation that the vague characterization of 'Communist-front organiza-
tions' in this law will be used to cripple or suppress many organizations 
which serve very desirable purposes, even if they do include some leftist 
people among their supporters." (p. 155). Some of the work of the Un-
American Activities Committee and comparable state committees undoubt-
edly supports Mr. Chafee's concern. On the other hand, there is at least 
room for argument that the administrative procedures required by the 
statute, as well as the provisions of judicial review, will tend to obviate 
the more obvious excesses attributable to such committees. Nevertheless, 
the fundamental question remains whether we are more inclined to trust 
the market-place of ideas or some agency of the government to distinguish 
the genuine from the spurious among programs ostensibly offered for the 
greater satisfaction of our wants or greater enjoyment of our freedom or 
greater realization of our ideals. For it is perhaps a factor of some signifi-
cance in this inquiry that people are seldom invited, in so many words, to 
choose slavery in preference to freedom; rather they are offered a road of 
apparent liberation from real or fancied oppression. This suggests that 
there may be a practicable middle ground between the government's stand-
ing idly by while democracy runs the risk of being duped to its destruction, 
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and the government's undertaking the responsibility of definitely labeling 
and virtually outlawing the siren call from Moscow, or any other capital of 
totalitarian ideology. For example, as Mr. Chafee mentions, truly objec-
tive disclosure requirements might be imposed upon all propaganda or-
ganizations competing for public favor, so as to enable prospective mem-
bers or contributors more intelligently to choose between them, in much the 
same fashion as appropriate disclosure requirements are applied to securi-
ties competing for public favor in the market-place of finance. 
As the McCarran Act itself illustrates by its emphasis upon a world 
Communist movement under foreign domination or control, the present 
crisis-if indeed there be one-in regard to freedom at home, is in no small 
part a reflection of a sense of crisis in our international relations. Nor is 
this a unique development, either in our own history, or in the comparable 
English experience.5 It is therefore peculiarly appropriate that Mr. Chafee's 
last two chapters should be concerned with the United Nations and freedom 
on the international scene-particularly with the Covenant on Human 
Rights and the Conference on Freedom of Information. Since Mr. Chafee 
was personally involved in working professionally on both of these projects, 
his views are to some extent a reflection of personal experience. Particularly 
interesting in the light of recent events are Mr. Chafee's comments regard-
ing his intellectual contacts with the satellite members of the Soviet bloc. 
Of the Poles and the Czechs he says: "Although at the Conference they 
echoed the Russians' ideology, I found their cultural background much 
closer to ours and could carry on an animated conversation with them on 
plenty of safe topics. Time may show that the Soviet system overextended, 
as the business men say, when it obliged Poland and Czechoslovakia to take 
orders from Moscow." (pp. 309-310) Even as this review is written, the 
air waves are full of reports of the latest upheavals in the satellite countries. 
But for this discussion the important issue is not whether Mr. Chafee is 
so soon to be proved a good or bad prophet. More important is his sugges-
tion that hope of real communication and exchange of ideas even with the 
Russians must not be abandoned. Thus Mr. Chafee dares to say: "The 
big problem as I see it is to bring the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics 
into the common heritage of Western thought .... My guess is that the 
process will not be a one-way street running solely in our direction. They 
will learn from us, but we shall also learn from them." (p. 310) This may 
be taken as a plea as well as a prophecy-a plea for recognition and accep-
tance of the elementary fact that the exchange of ideas is indeed a two-way 
street; that if we hope to penetrate the iron curtain with the ideals and 
attitudes of western democracy, we must take the risk of penetration of our 
own culture by the Soviet brand of "democratic" ideals. Recent events, 
IS See Sutherland, "British Trials for Disloyal Association during the French Revo-
lution," 34 CoRN. L. Q. 303 (1949). 
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particularly those in Hungary, may make this bitter medicine to take, but 
realistically considered, they provide all the more reason to persevere reso-
lutely in "cultural exchange" as the only feasible way of bringing the 
Soviet Union "into the common heritage of Western thought." 
Nathaniel Nathanson, 
Professor of Law, 
Northwestern University 
